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Anecdotal evidence exists for a stereotype of poor elderly driving 
performance but this stereotype has not been empirically documented despite 
possible detrimental effects through stereotype threat. Study 1, Experiment 1, 
measured implicit and explicit associations between aging and driving in older 
(>60) and younger (<31) adults. Individual differences in attentional control were 
measured using an operation span (OSPAN), working memory task. 
Associations between advanced age and impaired driving were found in both 
groups, and individual differences in attentional control correlated with implicit 
associations for older, but not younger adults. Study 1, Experiment 2, determined 
the extent to which attentional control moderates the stereotype’s implicit 
expression in young adults. Younger adults in Experiment 2 took the implicit 
association test (IAT) twice. Half were asked to control the stereotype by 
responding as if they were an older adult the second time. In this latter condition, 
individual differences in attention control predicted young adults’ change in IAT 
scores. 
Older adults from Study 1 also participated in Study 2. To test for the 
effects of stereotype threat, participants completed a car following scenario in a 
driving simulator, either under stereotype threat or control conditions. Dependent 
measures included brake reaction time, following distance, and collision 
iv 
occurrence. Compared to the control group, participants under stereotype threat 
were over six times more likely to collide with other vehicles. Further, under 
stereotype threat, participants lower in attentional control showed increased 
brake reaction times and following distances; a pattern often associated with 
distracted/impaired driving. 
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Older adults (age 60+) in the United States perceive the possession of a 
driver’s license as the key to independence and as an integral part of their 
personal and social identity (Eisenhandler, 1990). In a focus group study, 
Yassuda, Wilson, and von Mering (1997) found that older drivers planned to 
continue driving until severe physical limitations forced them to stop. As 
described by one group member, “they will pry my cold dead hands off the wheel 
before I stop driving” (p. 534). While young adults’ self-reported attitudes toward 
older adults appear to be positive (Valeri-Gold, 1996), anecdotal evidence 
supports the notion that older adults’ desires to retain their driving privileges are 
at odds with stereotypes about their driving abilities. For example, in a television 
episode of South Park, upon realizing that a senior center meeting is adjourning, 
a character runs through town yelling, “Get off the streets! Old people driving!” 
Other examples include an online blog, automoblog.net, which posted a 
discussion about whether or not older adults should be banned from driving. 
Blogger Chris Burdick (2007) stated, “I know for a fact that old people are a 
danger on the roads.”
The stereotype of older adults as bad drivers has not been examined in 
the otherwise voluminous literature on implicit and explicit stereotypes. This 




adults’ on-road driving performance through stereotype threat mechanisms (Steel 
& Aronson, 1995; Yeung & von Hippel, 2008). Stereotypes of stigmatized groups 
can have harmful effects on performance in stereotype-relevant domains (Davis 
& Simmons, 2009). In the domain of driving, the safety of our roadways may thus 
be jeopardized. Nearly 50,000 people die per year in car accidents and older 
adults are overrepresented. In 2009, older adults comprised 13% of the US 
population but accounted for 16% of all traffic fatalities (National Highway and 
Traffic Safety Administration, 2009). Examining negative stereotypes of older 
drivers may improve our understanding of a socially stigmatized group and 
ultimately save lives.  
This dissertation addressed four primary aims carried out through two 
studies. The first study 1) documented explicit and implicit stereotypes of older 
adults as hazards behind the wheel and 2) demonstrated a mechanism that 
allows control over the expression of implicit associations between aging and 
driving safety. The second study 3) established that older adult driving 
performance was susceptible to stereotype threat and 4) determined that 
attentional control predicted susceptibility of older adults to the impact of 








Social psychologists approach ageism as a phenomenon similar to sexism 
or racism in that it involves negative attitudes, stereotyping, and behavior. 
However, in the case of ageism, these negative attitudes, stereotypes, and 
behaviors are directed toward older adults based solely on their perceived age 
(Richeson & Shelton, 2006). This form of prejudice has been studied in terms of 
its applied manifestation explicitly and implicitly. For example, explicit ageism in 
the work place has affected seniors in the form of mandatory retirement ages 
(Hedge, Borman, & Lammlein, 2006). Implicitly, ageism can affect seniors in 
terms of health care decisions that are made by medical professionals but based 
on their negative attitudes and stereotypes toward the elderly (Adelman, Greene, 
Charon, & Friedman, 1990). Specific stereotypic trait components of older adults 
have also been examined (Hense, Penner, & Nelson, 1995; Nosek, Banaji, & 
Greenwald, 2002). Within the laboratory, investigations of the elderly stereotype 
have focused on identifying stereotypic traits such as “traditional,” “conservative,” 
and “lonely,” and more recently the trait of “forgetfulness” (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 
1981; Hess & Hinson, 2006; Horton, Baker, Pearce, & Deakin, 2008). However, 
despite the wide circulation of anecdotal evidence for a poor driving component 




Several scholars (Hense et al., 1995; Nosek et al., 2002) have empirically 
examined implicit and explicit stereotypic traits of older adults. Two studies 
alluded to stereotypes of older-adult drivers but did not systematically examine 
them. Moreover, these studies focused on positive aspects of older adult driving, 
such as slower, less aggressive driving tendencies (Branaghan & Gray, in press; 
Davies & Patel, 2005). Branaghan and Gray demonstrated that priming of the 
elderly stereotype caused young adult participants to drive slower and take 
longer to reach their destination. Davies and Patel collected ratings of 
aggressiveness for hypothetical drivers of different ages and genders. Elderly 
females were rated least aggressive followed by elderly males. These examples 
of positive older adult driving traits sharply contrast with the negative stereotype 
traits that surface within popular culture and the media. Given this discrepancy, 
the first aim of Experiment 1 was to empirically investigate the stereotype of older 
adult drivers.  
Research on the structure and function of stereotypes has demonstrated 
that they can be explicitly endorsed, implicitly held, or both. Implicit measurement 
techniques show that individuals who explicitly refuse to endorse social 
stereotypes may still carry implicit stereotypical associations. Notable among 
these techniques is the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which measures the 
relative strength of an association between a target and an attribute (Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). For example, White participants responded more 
quickly when the category black was paired with unpleasant than when the 




paired with pleasant than when white was paired with pleasant. This pattern 
persisted even when participants did not explicitly endorse negative stereotypes 
of Blacks (Nosek et al., 2002). 
Converging evidence suggests that IAT scores may be related to 
attentional control (Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008; 
Klauer, Schmitz, Teige-Mocigemba, & Voss, 2010; Payne, 2005; Richeson & 
Shelton, 2003). Attentional control refers to one’s ability to maintain a goal in 
working memory in the face of interference (Engle, 2002). This often requires 
overriding an automatic response in favor of a controlled response. Therefore, 
the IAT could recruit attentional control if individuals are encouraged to produce 
IAT scores consistent with their explicitly-endorsed egalitarian attitudes. 
Assuming a person has strong implicit associations between dangerous driving 
and old, successful goal maintenance would require overriding an automatic 
tendency to respond more quickly when safe or young and dangerous or old are 
paired, or overriding the tendency to respond more slowly when dangerous or 
young and safe or old are paired. Recently, Fiedler and Bluemke (2005) and 
Cvencek, Greenwald, Brown, Gray and Snowden (in press) demonstrated that 
some participants could successfully “fake” their IAT score by effectively 
suppressing stereotype expression on implicit tests. 
 
 
Study 1 Overview 
Study 1, Experiment 1, empirically addressed the discrepancy between 




in the media. The study assessed implicit associations between old and young 
with safe and dangerous, respectively, via a novel IAT while also collecting 
explicit measures of the stereotype in both young and older adults. It was 
hypothesized that young and older adults would produce IAT effects consistent 
with attitudes of dangerous older-adult drivers. This study also correlated 
individual differences in attentional control with IAT performance because implicit 
biases of older adults high in attentional control could differ from those lower in 
attentional control. High functioning older adults may not perceive themselves to 
be dangerous drivers and, in turn, may not hold strong negative associations 
between driving and aging. Older adults may also be motivated to control 
negative implicit associations of their own group, though it may be the case that 
only those high in attentional control have the ability to do so. To further 
investigate attentional control, Study 1, Experiment 2 tested whether younger 
adults were able to “fake” the IAT, responding as though they were older adults. 
Because faking likely requires goal maintenance to override automatic 
stereotypical associations, it was hypothesized that individual differences in 
attentional control would relate to young adults’ ability to fake, or suppress, their 
implicit attitudes toward aging and driving. In other words, I suspected feigned 
IAT outcomes, whether occurring spontaneously (as for older adults in 
Experiment 1) or in the context of explicit instruction (as for younger adults in 
Experiment 2), would be governed by a central attentional control mechanism 
underlying the ability to successfully regulate stereotypes.  Therefore, in Study 1, 




control would suppress the aging stereotype of driving, thereby changing their 







One hundred and seven University of Utah undergraduates (age range 
18-30 years, M = 21.34 years) participated in exchange for course credit. Fifty-
two community-dwelling older adults (age range 61-89 years, M = 72.52 years) 
participated and were compensated with $15. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
IAT  
The IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) is a reaction time task that measures the 
strength of association between two concepts. Associations are considered to be 
implicit because they can be activated automatically and measured outside of 
conscious control. The task involves comparing reaction times for classifying 
pairs of stimuli thought to be more strongly associated (e.g., fear and heights) 
than ones thought to be less associated (e.g., fear and flowers). When the 
pairing represents a strong implicit association, participants classify stimuli more 
quickly. 
In the present study’s seven-block IAT, modeled after Lane, Banaji, 




categories of safe or dangerous and faces as belonging to the categories old or 
young (see Figure 1).  
Verbal stimuli related to the concepts of safe and dangerous driving were 
compiled from the Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1999) word association 
norms as well as from the American Association of Retired Persons Driver Safety 
Program participant workbook. These lists, in addition to non-IAT safety relevant 
words and baseline nonsafety relevant words, were then rated by undergraduate 
students at the University of Utah in terms of the strength of their relationship to 
the concepts of safe and dangerous driving without any mention of aging. This 
was done to verify that the present stimuli differed from positively and negatively 
valenced verbal stimuli used in other aging IATs. The present stimuli were 
specifically driving-relevant1 (e.g., crash, observant), but the images of older and 
younger adults were taken from a previous IAT that examined associations 
between young/old and good/bad (Nosek et al., 2002). 
 
Explicit Measures 
Two explicit measures were created, a feeling thermometer, modeled after 
Greenwald et al. (1998) and a Likert scale questionnaire, created specifically for 
this study. The feeling thermometer asked participants to describe their general  
 
 
1IAT safety-relevant stimuli, non-IAT safety relevant words, and baseline 
non-safety-relevant words were rated by 70 undergraduate students on their 
relatedness to the concepts of safe and dangerous driving. IAT stimuli were 
judged to be significantly more related to the concepts of safe and dangerous 



























Figure 1. Sample IAT trial for which the participant’s job is to categorize 
the older adult image as old when the category is paired with safe by 





level of warmth or coolness toward two target concepts: senior citizens’ (≥ 60) 
and others’ (< 60) driving. Participants indicated warmth or coolness by circling 
an answer on a scale from 0 (very cold) to 10 (very warm). The 7-point Likert 
scale questionnaire (1 being agree and 7 being disagree) asked participants to 
endorse eight statements related to older adult driving, half worded affirmatively 
(e.g., “Most old people drive too slow and disrupt the flow of traffic.”) and half 
worded negatively (e.g., “Old drivers should not be required to retake driving 
tests more frequently than others.”). 
 
Attentional Control 
An operation span (OSPAN) working memory task measured attentional 
control. The automated OSPAN task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005) 
was administered to multiple young adult participants at once. Older adults were 
given an experimenter-guided version of the task (Turner & Engle, 1998) 
administered individually by an experimenter, thereby reducing potential 
technology-related anxiety that could confound scores. The OSPAN task requires 
individuals to solve math problems while concurrently remembering letters 
(automated task) or words (experimenter-guided task). Math and letter/word pairs 
were presented in sets that ranged in size from 3-7 (automated task) or 2-5 
(experimenter-guided task), with the letters/words being recalled in the correct 
serial order at the end of each set. An absolute scoring system gave participants 
one point for each word recalled, but only for sets in which all words were 




was 75. For the experimenter-guided task, the maximum score was 42. While no 
normative data exist for older adults, the young adult distribution of OSPAN 
scores in this sample was reasonably similar to that of Unsworth et al. with a 
mean of 42.40, lower quartile of 30 and upper quartile of 54, where Unsworth et 
al. observed a mean of 39.16, lower quartile of 28 and upper quartile of 56. 
Participants (N=3) who scored below 80% on the math portion of the test were 
excluded from the final data set.  
 
Procedure 
All participants sat in front of a computer monitor, first for the OSPAN, and 
then for the IAT. IAT instructions informed participants that the purpose of the 
task was to measure implicit associations between the concepts of driving and 
aging. Category pairings appeared in the upper left and right corners of the 
computer screen. Words and images appeared in the middle of the screen. Each 
word and image appeared individually, and participants sorted it into the correct 
category label by pressing a key on the keyboard that corresponded to the 
spatial location of the correct category. Thus, if the category pairings were safe 
or old on the left and dangerous or young on the right, then participants correctly 
sorted the word crash by pressing the key on the right side of the keyboard. It 
was hypothesized that participants would be slower to categorize crash when 
safe was in the same spatial location as old compared to when dangerous or old 
were paired together. The IAT took approximately 10 minutes to complete. 




or faces remained on the screen until participants responded. Each stimulus 
presentation was separated by a 500 ms interstimulus interval (ISI) for trials in 
which the participant responded correctly. If the participant responded incorrectly, 
a screen indicating an error appeared in place of the 500 ms ISI for the same 
duration but participants did not need to correct their response. Participants then 
completed packets containing the explicit attitude measures. 
 
Results 
All means and standard deviations of implicit and explicit measures are 
displayed in the top half of Table 1. IAT D scores were calculated for each 
individual using Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji’s (2003) algorithm. For each 
participant, this D score represented the difference in mean reaction time across 
the two paired conditions (safe or old/dangerous or young, and dangerous or 
old/safe or young) divided by the standard deviation of all trials of each pairing for 
each participant. Consistent with Greenwald et al. (2003), trials with reaction 
times greater than 10,000 ms were removed from the data set prior to D score 
calculations. No participants’ data were deleted because of unusually fast 
reactions times (<300 ms). Consistent with the improved IAT scoring algorithm, 
error trials were not removed from analyses. D scores above zero indicated 
stronger associations between the safe-young and dangerous-old category 
pairings than dangerous-young and safe-old, evidence for a negatively valenced 










Means (and standard deviations) of implicit scores (IAT D), attentional control 
(OSPAN), and explicit scores [feeling thermometer (FT), and Likert scale] in 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Group         IAT1 D          IAT2 D         OSPAN            FT          Likert scale 
Experiment 1 
Young  .43 (.24)                       42.40 (16.26     2.63 (2.35)     4.78 (.60) 
Old   .37 (.33)                       14.56 (7.69)    -.10 (2.21)        5.44 (.80) 
Experiment 2 
Practice            .40 (.26)     .39 (.24)    42.00 (18.32)     2.17 (2.42)    4.38 (.56) 




Both younger and older adults exhibited stronger associations between the 
safe-young and dangerous-old category pairings than dangerous-young and 
safe-old [young t(106)=18.25, p<.001, d=1.79; old t(51)=8.73, p<.001, d=1.12].  
An independent samples t-test showed D scores were not significantly different 
between young and older adults, t(157)=0.3, p=.12, d=.05, suggesting the implicit 
association strength may not differ with age. 
A feeling thermometer difference score was calculated by subtracting each 
participant’s rating on item one (older-adult driving) from his or her rating on item 
two (others’ driving); thus, positive scores indicated greater feelings of warmth 
toward others’ driving than older-adults’ driving and negative scores indicated the 
opposite. Younger adults reported greater feelings of warmth toward others’ 
driving than older-adults’ driving while the opposite was the case for older adults. 
One sample t-test confirmed that younger adults’ mean difference score 
significantly differed from zero, t(106)=11.56, p<.001, d=1.06, but older adults’ 
did not, t(51)= -.31, p=.76, d=.05.Younger adults felt colder toward older adults’ 
driving than others’ driving, but older adults did not show this difference. An 
independent samples t-test comparing younger adults’ feeling thermometer 
difference scores to those of older adults showed young adults reported warmer 
feelings toward other drivers than older adult drivers, t(157)=7.00, p<.001, 
d=1.12. For the Likert scale questionnaire, an independent samples t-test 
comparing older adults’ endorsements of stereotypes of older drivers to those of 
younger adults found younger adults reported slightly stronger endorsements 




were greater than the scale’s neutral point of 4, suggesting that neither group 
was willing to explicitly endorse these overtly negative statements. 
Bivariate correlations among IAT D, OSPAN, feeling thermometer, and 
Likert scales were examined for younger and older adults. The analyses showed 
attentional control did not correlate with younger adults’ IAT D, r(106)= .13, 
p=.18; however, it correlated with older adults’ IAT D, r(51)= -.28, p=.04 (see 
Figure 2). For older adults, as attentional control decreased, IAT Ds increased. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that both younger and older adults hold 
implicit associations between aging and dangerous driving; however, only older 
adults’ IAT effects correlated with attentional control. As members of the 
stereotyped group, older adults may have spontaneously exerted attentional 
control toward the goal of appearing more egalitarian. If so, their relative success 
in controlling this stereotype would depend upon individual differences in 
attentional control. Also, older adults high in attentional control may have been 
more likely to attempt to control the stereotype. The relationship between aging 
and driving performance is greatly diminished once individual differences in 
attentional control are taken into account (Lambert et al., in preparation).  In other 
words, older adults high in attentional control tend to be better drivers, so these  
individuals may be more able to control their reactions to stereotypes of aging 













Figure 2. Scatter plots of IAT 
OSPAN for young, experimenter
(top panel) and older (bottom panel) adults in Experiment 1. Least 
squares regression lines indicate a non
for young adults and a significant negative correlation for older adults
 
r = .13 
r = -.28 
D and attentional control (automated 
-guided OSPAN for old) for younger 








But, younger adults may also be able to control their implicit associations. 
When instructed to “fake” IAT effects by responding as though one were a 
member of another group (e.g., male responding as though he were female), 
some young adults can produce IAT effects contrary to their own implicit 
associations (Cvencek et al., in press; Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; Steffens, 2004). 
Faking instructions give participants a specific goal; therefore, successful faking 
inherently involves goal maintenance. Because goal maintenance is a critical 
function of attentional control, individual differences in attentional control should 
correlate with IAT faking ability. Experiment 2 tested this hypothesis with only 





 Two-hundred and twenty-six young adults (age range 18-30 years, M = 
21.60 years) from the University of Utah participated in exchange for course 
credit. Data from 10 participants were not retained for analysis due to OSPAN 
math accuracy below 80%. 
 
Materials and Procedures 
The materials and procedures were identical to Experiment 1 with one 
notable exception. After completing the OSPAN and the first IAT (IAT1), 107 




colleagues (in press). These participants were told to take a second IAT test 
(IAT2) while responding as though they were older adults by 1) going slowly for 
the condition in which the safe-young and dangerous-old category pairings 
shared a response key and 2) going quickly for the condition in which dangerous-
young and safe-old shared a response key. An additional 109 participants were 
given practice instructions to simply take the test again. 
 
Results 
Means and standard deviations for implicit, explicit, and attentional control 
measures are displayed in the bottom half of Table 1. For each participant, two 
IAT D scores, one for each time participants took the test, were calculated using 
the algorithm of Experiment 1. One participant’s data were deleted from the 
practice condition because more than 10% of trials had latencies less than 300 
ms. 
 On IAT1, mean D scores of both groups were consistent in magnitude and 
direction with the young adults in Experiment 1. One sample t-test determined 
that both means significantly differed from zero [faking group prior to faking 
instructions t(106)=18.74, p<.001, d=1.80; practice group prior to practice 
instructions t(108)=15.93, p<.001, d=1.67], replicating the findings of Experiment 
1. On IAT2, mean D scores of the practice group were again consistent in 
magnitude and direction with Experiment 1; however, the magnitude and 
direction changed for participants instructed to fake [faking t(106)= -3.02, p=.003, 




successfully able to “fake” the IAT. Both groups reported greater feelings of 
warmth toward others driving than older-adults driving with both mean 
differences significantly differing from zero [faking t(106)=10.30, p<.001, d=1.0; 
practice t(108)=9.32, p<.001, d=.90]. Likert Scale questionnaire means between 
the two conditions were compared but did not differ p>.10.  
IAT D change scores were calculated for each participant as the 
difference between IAT1 and IAT2 Ds. Bivariate correlations among IAT1D, 
IAT2D, D change, OSPAN, feeling thermometer, and Likert means were 
computed. Consistent with Experiment 1, attentional control did not correlate with 
IAT D scores for either group’s IAT1 [practice r(108)= -.13, p= .19, faking 
r(106)=.02, p=.836], or IAT2 scores for the practice condition, r(108)=.01, 
p=.913]. While attentional control did not correlate with D change scores for the 
practice condition, r(108)= -.19, p=.259, it did correlate with IAT2 D scores 
r(106)= -.20, p=.037, and D change scores r(106)= -.20., p=.04. Participants in 
the faking condition regulated their responses on the driving and age IAT, but 
those lower in attentional control showed a smaller D change. This suggests 
greater attentional control is necessary to maximally alter IAT response patterns. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Again, observing a similar distribution to Unsworth et al. (2005) (mean = 
42.40, lower quartile = 29 and upper quartile = 55), extreme groups were created 
by dividing participants into quartiles based on their OSPAN scores. Participants 




further analysis. OSPAN scores ranged from 0 to 29 (low-spans) and 55 to 75 
(high-spans). These data were submitted to a 2 (attentional control: low-span vs. 
high-span) by 2 (condition: practice vs. faking) repeated measures ANOVA with 
IAT1 and IAT2 Ds (order) as the within-participants dependent variables. The 
other two factors were between-participants. There were main effects of order, 
F(1,104)=52.74, p<.001, η2p=.34, and condition, F(1,104)=24.07, p<.001, η2p=.19 
but the main effect of attentional control was not significant F<1. There was also 
a two-way interaction between order and condition, F(1,104)=38.04, p<.001, 
η2p=.27. IAT1 scores only differed from IAT2 scores in the faking condition. Most 
importantly, there was a three-way interaction among condition, order, and 
attentional control, F(1,104)=4.84, p=.030, η2p=.04, such that in the faking 
condition, high-spans produced more IAT change from IAT1 to IAT2 than low-




These results demonstrate that attentional control can modulate implicit 
associations but, the degree to which modulation occurs depends on individual 
differences in attentional control. Fiedler and Bluemke (2005) and Cevencek et 
al. (in press) have shown that some participants can fake IAT effects 
spontaneously or when cued to do so. The present results extend this work by 
identifying an individual differences variable that predicts who will be most able to 








Figure 3. Mean IAT D
(bottom panel)] and attentional control (high=top 25%, low=bottom 
25%). Error bars correspond to standard error of the mean. IAT 
only differ from IAT 1 to IAT 2 in the faking condition where participants 
high in attentional control show more change from IAT 1 to IAT 2 than 
those low in attentional control.
 










faking is detectable and correctable; thus, the finding that some people may be 
able to control their IAT is not likely a validity concern for the IAT. The more 
interesting implication of this finding is that it suggests that, in certain situations, 
people high in attentional control may be better able to control the expression of 
their own implicit associations. 
 
Study 1 General Discussion 
 The present study is the first to empirically examine the stereotype of older 
adult driving ability despite the wide circulation of anecdotal examples in the 
media. It produced clear evidence that younger and older adults possess implicit 
attitudes of dangerous older adult driving, and that young adults explicitly 
endorse these attitudes when presented as feelings of warmth or coolness. 
Further, attentional control was related to older and younger adult IAT effects. 
Older adults higher in attentional control showed smaller IAT effects than older 
adults who had lower attentional control, possibly because they were internally 
motivated and able to control their response speeds. Attentional control was also 
related to young adults’ abilities to alter their performance on the IAT. Those 
higher in attentional control showed greater change and less overt expression of 
the aging stereotype when instructed explicitly to do so. These patterns suggest 
that attentional control may be a critical factor in controlling implicit associations 





The role of attentional control discussed here is consistent with the 
broader literatures on social stereotypes and individual differences in cognition. 
For example, Schmader and Johns (2008) showed that stereotype threat affects 
performance through attentional control by depleting controlled processing 
resources. Watson, Bunting, Poole, and Conway (2005) found that individual 
differences in attentional control predicted young adults’ abilities to reduce false 
memories, which are thought to be partially driven by automatic associations and 
implicit processes (Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). Using a 
weapon identification task, Payne (2005) found that attentional control moderated 
the relationship between automatic stereotype activation and behavioral 
expression of race bias. The present work shows that attentional control can 
affect IAT outcomes as well, providing theoretical leverage on who is most likely 
capable of faking (or correcting) susceptibility to stereotype activation.   
 
Implications, Applications, and Future Directions 
 There is a long-established relationship between negative stereotypes, 
prejudice, and discrimination (Fiske, 1998; Krueger, 1996), such that stereotypes 
of stigmatized groups impact behavior through stereotype threat (Steele & 
Aronson, 1995). Yeung and von Hippel (2008) found females were 50% more 
likely to hit jay-walking pedestrians in a driving simulator when negative 
stereotypes about female drivers were activated. Thus, stereotype threat could 
be endangering those on the road. Moreover, Steele and Aronson (1995) 




behavior. When African American participants were asked to simply indicate their 
race on a demographic questionnaire, they underperformed on a subsequent 
intelligence test. Thus, simply making one’s group salient can activate stereotype 
threat. For the purposes of the present study, the mere mention of senior driving 
restrictions could impact older adult driving performance. To the extent that older 
adults higher in attentional control can influence their implicit associations, similar 
patterns may emerge with regard to regulating stereotype threat in actual driving 
performance, such that the deleterious effects of stereotype threat might only be 
observed in older adults lower in attentional control. Future research endeavors 
aimed at elucidating these potential stereotype threat outcomes for older drivers 
could provide leverage toward the development of successful interventions and 







Steele and Aronson (1995) first demonstrated stereotype threat by making 
African Americans aware of the negative stereotype of inferior intellectual ability, 
leading them to subsequently underperform on standardized tests. This effect 
has been extended to other social groups and social stereotypes including poor 
performance across gender and race (Aronson et al., 1999; Spencer, Steele, 
Quinn, Hunter, & Forden, 2002). Stereotype threat manipulations that have 
involved older adults focused on the effect of stereotype threat on memory, 
demonstrating that threat-inducing task instructions can activate stereotype 
threat causing older adults to underperform on memory tests compared to age-
matched controls (Chasteen, Bhattacharyya, Horhota, Tam, & Hasher, 2005; 
Hess & Hinson, 2006;  Rahhal, Hasher, & Colombe, 2001). Because poor driving 
ability is an additional component of the older adult stereotype, as demonstrated 
in Study 1, older adult driving performance may be vulnerable to the deleterious 
effects of stereotype threat. If so, threat-induced performance decrements could 
endanger not only the stigmatized individuals, but others as well, because a 
single individual’s quality of driving carries the potential to affect anyone on the 




performance as a dependent measure. Yeung and von Hippel (2008) 
demonstrated that simulated driving performance can be impacted by stereotype 
threat manipulations. Women under stereotype threat conditions were 50% more 
likely to run over jay-walking pedestrians as those free from stereotype threat. 
The present study measured the impact of stereotype threat on older adult 
driving performance on two standard driving performance parameters (brake 
reaction time, and following distance) used extensively in research on driving and 
attention (Cooper & Strayer, 2008; Strayer & Drews, 2004; Strayer & Johnston, 
2001) as well as the likelihood of in-simulator collisions. 
If stereotype threat manipulations impact older adult driving performance, 
attentional control is a plausible moderator for these effects. Traditionally, 
stereotype threat effects have called upon explanations based on affect: the idea 
that activation of negative stereotypes about one’s group leads to feelings of 
anxiety or apprehension related to the possibility that the individual might confirm 
those negative stereotypes. However, it is possible that the apprehension the 
threat manipulation induces could disrupt cognitive processing operations as well 
(Schmader & Johns, 2003).  Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency 
theory holds that anxiety reduces the function of goal-directed attention while 
increasing stimulus-driven processing. Thus, the anxiety that stereotype threat 
manipulations induce should lead to decrements in performance on tasks that 
are demanding of attentional control functions such as working memory. 
Following this line of thought, Schmader and Johns (2003) argued that working 




consumption of limited cognitive resources by stress-related thoughts. To test 
this idea, they manipulated instruction sets given to women prior to their 
engagement in an OSPAN task. Because the OSPAN task requires participants 
to solve simple arithmetic while also memorizing words, stereotype threat was 
induced in women by stressing the importance of the math component of the task 
as being diagnostic of mathematic ability. They hypothesized that, if stereotype 
threat interferes with working memory, then women exposed to threat-inducing 
instructions would show lower OSPAN scores than women in the control 
condition. Their results were consistent with this prediction. Similar results have 
also been found for Latino men and women compared to White men and women 
when task instructions included information that the OSPAN test was diagnostic 
of intelligence. 
Schmader, Johns, and Forbes (2008) have since proposed an integrated 
process model of stereotype threat to further specify the role of attentional control 
in stereotype threat outcomes. This model holds that stereotype threat effects are 
driven by three interrelated mechanisms: a physiological stress response that 
directly impedes attentional control, an increased tendency to actively monitor 
performance, and self-regulatory efforts to suppress negative thoughts and 
emotions. The concurrent operation of these mechanisms consumes cognitive 
resources needed to perform well on a variety of tasks, especially those highly 
demanding of attentional control resources. Further strengthening this view, the 
biological plausibility of a prefrontal neuro- anatomical correlate of stereotype 




operation of stereotype threat using fMRI, and ERP methodologies (Forbes, 
Schmader, & Allen, 2008; Krendl, Richeson, Kelley, & Heatherton, 2008; Wraga, 
Helt, Jacobs, & Sullivan, 2007). 
The integrated processing theory of stereotype threat extends conceptual 
explanations of stereotype threat by providing a neuro-anatomical correlate. 
Neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies have demonstrated the 
frontal lobes to be especially susceptible to aging (Watson, Balota, & Sergent-
Marshall, 2001; West, 1996). Thus, populations suffering from problems rooted in 
frontal lobe atrophy, such as some older adults, should show enhanced 
susceptibility to stereotype threat manipulations when the affected task relies on 
controlled processing resources. If the frontal lobes play a role in stereotype 
threat, then individual differences in frontally mediated attentional control should 
predict which individuals will be most susceptible to the negative impact of 
stereotype threat. Because driving is an attentionally demanding task (Strayer, 
2007; Strayer & Drews 2004; Watson, Lambert, Miller, & Strayer, 2011; Watson 
& Strayer, 2010), individual differences in attentional control should predict who 
is most at risk to experience the deleterious effects of stereotype threat on driving 
performance. 
In addition to stereotype threat effects in pedestrian collisions, Yeung and 
von Hipple (2008) also tested for stereotype threat effects on more nuanced 
driving performance parameters, speed and lateral position; however, no effects 
were observed. This may have been because these particular parameters were 




was depleted by the stereotype threat manipulation. In a preliminary study, 
Lambert et al. (in preparation) demonstrated that attentional control, as 
measured by an OSPAN task, was predictive of younger and older adult driving 
performance parameters of brake reaction time and following distance but was 
unrelated to speed or lateral position. In light of this, the present study employed 
a car following paradigm wherein participants followed a lead vehicle in a 
highway environment, traveling at highway speeds, for approximately 15 
minutes. Participants were trained to follow the lead vehicle at a 2-seconds-to-
collision distance and apply their brakes periodically when the brakes of the lead 
vehicle illuminated. Half of the participants did this under stereotype threat. 
Measurements of brake reaction time, following distance, and occurrences of 
collisions, recorded as 1s (collision) and 0s (no collision) in a binary fashion, 
were collected as well as whether or not participants remembered to take a 
prescribed exit to end the driving scenario [recorded as 1s (no exit) and 0s (exit) 
in a binary fashion]. It was predicted that participants under stereotype threat 
would show slower brake reaction times, longer following distances, higher 
collision rates, and lower likelihood of following exit instructions than those 
completing the drive without threat. Additionally, it was predicted that brake 
reaction times and following distances of participants lower in attentional control 
would be most impacted by the stereotype threat manipulation. 
A second driving scenario was also created to in attempt to replicate 
Yeung and von Hippel’s (2008) findings. A short unexpected event scenario 




threat or control conditions. It was predicted that, under stereotype threat, 




The 392 older adults from Experiment 1 of Study 1 were included in the 
present study. Participants ranged in age from 62 to 83 years with a mean age of 
73 years.  All participants were currently licensed drivers and all received $30.00 
compensation for their participation. 
 
Materials 
PatrolSim Driving Simulator 
A PatrolSim high-fidelity driving simulator, manufactured by L3 
Communications/I-SIM with high resolution displays and 180-degree field of view 
was used. The simulator recreated a realistic driving environment through 
vehicle-dynamics, traffic-scenario, and road-surface software. Simulator 
dashboard instrumentation, steering wheel, and gas and brake pedals were 




2Sixty participants volunteered in Study 2. Of these, 39 were retained for 
analysis. The remaining 21 were excluded due to motion sickness (n = 12), 
inability to reach the gas and brake pedals with feet (n=2), answering a cell 
phone call while driving (n=1), a request to have data removed from the study 
(n=1), and maintaining an inappropriate following distance (greater than 3 times 





Experimenter-Guided Operation Span Task 
An experimenter-guided version of the OSPAN working memory task, 
described for older adults in Experiment 1 of Study 1, measured attentional 
control.  
 
Implicit Stereotype Measure 
An implicit association test, described in Experiment 1 of Study 1, 
measured implicit associations between driving safety and age. 
 
Explicit Stereotype Measures 
A feeling thermometer and a Likert Scale questionnaire, described in 




 A five-question measure of perceived stereotype threat, adapted after 
Steele and Aronson (1995), was used as a manipulation check. These five 
questions assess people’s beliefs about age and driving performance using a 5-









 Participants completed two sessions carried out 1 day to 2 weeks apart. 
During their first session, stereotype threat was manipulated and driving 
performance was measured.  During their second session, attentional control and 




All participants were tested individually. Upon arrival at the cognitive 
science lab, participants were greeted by an experimenter in a lab coat who 
obtained informed consent. Visual acuity and colorblindness were tested, after 
which, participants were introduced to the driving simulator. They were 
familiarized with the simulated driving environment using a short adaptation 
sequence in which they drove down a low traffic residential road for 
approximately 5 minutes.  Next, participants were trained to follow a lead vehicle 
on the highway at a 2-second-to-collision following distance, braking whenever 
they saw the lead vehicle’s brake lights illuminate. If they fell too far behind, a 
horn sounded. This was their cue to reduce their following distance by increasing 
their speed. Once they reduced their following distance to 2 seconds, the horn 
stopped. Participants were told that, while there would not be a horn in future 
driving scenarios, they were to use the practice as a guide for appropriate 





Stereotype Threat Manipulation 
Participants were randomly assigned to the stereotype threat or control 
condition. After the car following adaptation sequence, participants assigned to 
the stereotype threat condition were told the following: 
“OK, before we begin collecting driving data, I want to tell you a little more 
about the purpose of this study.  Older adults, as a group, are stereotyped 
to be bad drivers.  While it may not be the case that all older adults are 
bad drivers, there is some evidence that this stereotype may be true.  
Here are some examples of evidence that older adults may be bad 
drivers.”  
 
Participants were then handed two study material sheets. One contained two 
news clippings reporting on elderly drivers in severe traffic accidents (see 
Appendix B) and the other contained a graph of national statistics on fatal 
crashes (adjusted for 100 million miles driven) by driver age (see Appendix C).  
The graph formed a U-shaped function such that fatal crashes were high for 
teenage drivers and then dropped off dramatically by age 25. Fatal crashes 
remained low and stable throughout middle age only to rise again later in life. At 
age 80, fatal crashes rose exponentially. News clippings were read aloud to the 
participant as participants read them silently. The experimenter explained 
elements of the graph to each participant, focusing on the rise in fatal crashes 
later in life.  Participants were then told the following:  
“One purpose of this study is to test whether or not this stereotype is valid. 
To do so we will be recording data on your driving performance in the next 
two driving scenarios.” 
 






Control Condition  
Participants in the control condition did not receive any stereotype threat 
instructions or materials and simply progressed to the experimental drives 
following the two adaptation sequences. 
 
Experimental Drive 1  
All participants drove for approximately 15 minutes in the center lane of a 
multilane highway following a pace car programmed to drive in the right lane and 
brake sporadically throughout the scenario. There were other vehicles on the 
road in the lanes to the left and right of the participant and the lead vehicle, but 
these vehicles were programmed to remain in the adjacent lanes and, as such, 
did not interfere with the participant or the lead vehicle. Like in the practice, 
participants were to follow at an approximately 2-second headway, braking 
whenever the lead vehicle braked. They were instructed to follow the lead vehicle 
until they came to the exit to Murray. They were also told to take the exit to 
Murray to end the drive.  This maneuver required participants to make a lane 
change to the right into free flowing traffic prior to taking the exit. If participants 
failed to remember to take the exit, the scenario ended automatically 
approximately 30 seconds after the exit was missed. Collisions and exit attempts 
were recorded and measurements of following distance from the lead vehicle and 






Experimental Drive 2 
Following a 5-minute break, participants completed a second experimental 
drive. The purpose of this drive was to create a driving situation similar to the one 
employed by Yeung and von Hippel (2009) using the constraints of the driving 
simulator available in the present study. In this scenario, participants were 
instructed to drive straight down the highway at 60 miles per hour until the 
scenario automatically ended. The duration of the drive was short (approximately 
3 minutes) and consisted of rural and residential scenery. Driving visibility was 
hampered by foggy, nighttime conditions. Participants proceeded uneventfully 
down the road until they approached a man riding a bicycle. The cyclist was 
traveling in the same direction and in the same lane as the participants.  There 
were cones blocking most of the opposing lane of oncoming traffic. 
Unexpectedly, the bicyclist swerved, turning toward the participant’s vehicle, and 
began to move into the participant’s lane. This created a situation that required 
the participant to swerve to avoid hitting the bicyclist. Pilot testing allowed these 
events to be calibrated such that they occurred simultaneously if the participant 
was driving 60 miles per hour, as instructed.  If the participant collided with the 
bicyclist, the scenario ended.  If the participant did not collide with the bicyclist, 
the participant proceeded down the road for about 30 seconds until the scenario 
automatically ended. 
Following this scenario, participants completed the five-question measure 
of perceived stereotype threat. They were then partially debriefed, wherein they 




effects on older adult driving performance. All participants were paid $15.00 for 
their time and effort prior to leaving the lab. 
 
Session 2 
Participants returned to the lab as early as 1 day or as late as 2 weeks 
later for their second session. They were again consented and tested 
individually. Participants then completed the Study 1 Experiment 1 procedure. 
The experimenter-guided OSPAN task was administered, followed by the implicit 
and explicit stereotype measures. All participants were fully debriefed and paid 




 A mean score on the perceived stereotype threat questionnaire was 
computed for each participant with higher means indicating stronger perceptions 
of stereotype threat. An independent samples t-test then compared perceived 
stereotype threat of control participants to stereotype threat participants. While 
mean scores of stereotype threat participants were numerically higher (M = 2.50) 
than control participants (M = 2.22), this difference was not statistically 
significant, p >.10. However, it may have been the case that the manipulation 
only impacted those low in attentional control. In order to test for the possibility of 
an obscured interaction between attentional control and stereotype threat, 




and attentional control were entered simultaneously in the first step and the 
interaction term of stereotype threat and attentional control was entered in the 
second step with perceived stereotype threat as the dependent variable. Neither 
the first step [R2 =.089, F(2,36) = 1.76, MSe=.94, p =.186] nor the second step 
[R2 =.097, F(3,36) = 1.26, MSe=.94, p =.304] resulted in significant models.  
 
Experimental Drive 1 
Brake RT 
Mean brake RTs were computed for each participant. Hierarchical multiple 
linear regression was used to examine the effects of the independent variables of 
stereotype threat and attentional control on the dependent variable of brake RT. 
In this regression, stereotype threat and attentional control were entered 
simultaneously in the first step and the interaction term of stereotype threat and 
attentional control was entered in the second step with brake RT as the 
dependent variable. The first step resulted in a significant model [R2 =.238, 
F(2,36) = 5.63, MSe=.49, p =.007] with a main effect of stereotype threat (β = 
.333, p=.042), and a main effect of attentional control (β = -0.028, p=.016). The 
second step of the regression also resulted in a significant model [R2 =.380, 
F(3,35) = 4.50, MSe=.45, p =.001] where an interaction between stereotype 
threat and attentional control (β = -0.058, p=.008) qualified the main effects 
observed in step 1. 
In order to better understand the direction of this interaction, attentional 




thirds to create three groups (low, medium, and high attentional control). Analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) was then used to examine effects of the independent 
variables of attentional control and stereotype threat on brake reaction time. This 
resulted in a main effect of stereotype threat [F(1,33) = 4.34, p = .045, η2p=.116] 
and a main effect of attentional control [F(2,33) = 3.58, p = .039, η2p=.178] that 
was qualified by an interaction between attentional control and stereotype threat 
[F(2,33) = 6.94, p =.003, η2p=.296] such that stereotype threat increased brake 
reaction time (see Figure 4)  
 
Following Distance 
Mean following distances were computed for each participant. Hierarchical 
multiple linear regression was used to examine the effects of the independent 
variables of stereotype threat and attentional control on the dependent variable of 
following distance. In this regression, stereotype threat and attentional control 
were entered in the first step and the interaction term of stereotype threat and 
attentional control was entered in the second step with following distance as the 
dependent variable. The first step resulted in a significant model [R2 =.190, 
F(2,36) = 4.229, MSe=.15.27, p =.022] with a main effect of stereotype threat (β 
= 41.341, p=.047), and a marginal effect of attentional control (β = 10.063, 
p=.057). The second step of the regression also resulted in a significant model 
[R2 =.320, F(3,35) = 5.487, MSe=14.197., p =.003] where an interaction between 
stereotype threat and attentional control (β = -1.668, p=.014) qualified the main 












Figure 4. Mean brake RTs by condition (stereotype threat vs. control) 
and attentional control (high = top 33.3%, medium = middle 33.3%, low 
= bottom 33.3%). Error bars correspond to standard error of the mean. 






In order to better understand the direction of this interaction, attentional  
control was again treated categorically by dividing attentional control scores into 
thirds to create three groups (low, medium, and high attentional control). ANOVA 
was used to examine effects of the independent variables of attentional control 
and stereotype threat on following distance. This resulted in a main effect of 
stereotype threat [F(1,33) = 4.21, p = .048, η2p=.113] that was qualified by an 
interaction between attentional control and stereotype threat [F(2,33) = 4.95, p 
=.013, η2p=.231] such that stereotype threat increased following distance only for 
participants low in attentional control (see Figure 5). 
 
Bivariate Correlations 
 Bivariate correlations were computed and scatterplots were created (see 
Figure 6) in order to represent the observed relationships between driving 
performance (brake RT and following distance) and attentional control.  For 
control participants, no significant correlations were observed between 
attentional control and either of the driving performance parameters [brake RT: 
r(18)= .113, p=.644, following distance: r(18)= .211, p=.385]. However, for 
participants under stereotype threat, significant correlations were observed 
between attentional control and both of the driving performance parameters 
[brake RT: r(19)= - .617, p=.004, following distance: r(19)= - .530, p=.016] such 
that longer brake RTs and following distances were observed for participants 















Figure 5. Mean following distances by condition (stereotype threat vs. 
control) and attentional control (high = top 33.3%, medium = middle 
33.3%, low = bottom 33.3%). Error bars correspond to standard error 
of the mean. Only those low in attentional control elongated their 








Figure 6. Scatter plots of older adult driving performance (brake 
reaction time and following distance) and attentional control under 
control or stereotype threat conditions. Least squares regression lines 
in the top left (brake reaction time) and right (following distance) panels 
depict a nonsignificant correlation between attentional control and 
driving performance under control conditions. Least squares regression 
lines in the bottom left (brake reaction time) and right (following 
distance) panels depict significant correlations between attentional 
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Six collisions occurred across participants in Experimental Drive 1. Five of 
the participants under stereotype threat experienced a collision compared to 1  
control participant. Data were first examined using hierarchal binary logistic 
regression to assess the possible role of attentional control in collision likelihood. 
For this analysis, attentional control and stereotype threat were entered in the 
first step of the analysis and the interaction of these variables was entered in the 
second step. In the first step, neither main effect was significant [attentional 
control (Wald = .31, p > .10), stereotype threat (Wald = 2.380, p > .10)]. Likewise, 
the second step of the analysis revealed no main effects [attentional control 
(Wald = .65, p > .10), stereotype threat (Wald = .92, p > .10)], or interaction 
between attentional control and stereotype threat (Wald = .512, p > .10).   
To quantify collision risk regardless of attentional control, an odds ratio was 
calculated. Traditional methods for calculating the significance of an odds ratio 
(Fisher’s exact test) have been shown to be problematic (too conservative) for 
small samples (see Agresti, 2002). Thus, statistical significance (Odds Ratio > 1) 
was calculated using Barnard’s method (Agresti, 2002). Barnard's exact test 
calculates the probability of getting the particular data combination or a more 
extreme combination out of all possible combinations and then uses the chi-
square distribution with the degrees of freedom from the data to determine the 
significance. The risk of collision was significantly greater for stereotype threat 







 Thirty-six of the 39 participants remembered to take the Murray exit to end 
the driving scenario.  All 3 participants who failed to take the exit had been 
assigned to the stereotype threat condition. Likelihood of remembering to take 
the exit to Murray to end the driving scenario as a function of stereotype threat 
was also examined using Barnard’s exact test. However, because no control 
participant failed to take the exit, a constant of .5 was added to each cell in the 2 
×2 matrix so as to avoid an infinite odds ratio (Yates, 1934). This analysis 
resulted in a marginally significant odds ratio [odds ratio = 7.8, p=.090 (one 
tailed)]. Though caution is warranted in interpretation due to marginal 
significance, this trend suggests that, under stereotype threat, participants were 
more likely to forget to take the exit to end the scenario. 
 
Experimental Drive 2 
Likelihood of collisions with the bicyclist was examined using the 
Barnard’s method as described above; however, no data were collected from 2 of 
the 39 participants reported in Experimental Drive 1 due to their request to 
discontinue the driving portion of the experiment after the first experimental drive. 
Thirty-two of the 37 participants collided with the bicyclist. Of the 5 who avoided 
collision, 4 were control participants and 1 was a stereotype threat participant. 
While numerically these data trended in the predicted direction, the risk of 
collision with the bicyclist was not significantly greater for the stereotype threat 






As reported in the procedures section, measures of implicit and explicit 
stereotype associations and attentional control were collected during participants’ 
second session, after they had completed the driving simulation. A partial 
debriefing was administered at the end of the first session during which 
stereotype threat had been manipulated. In this debriefing, participants were told 
about stereotype threat and shown the stereotype threat induction materials. The 
experimenter explained to them that past research on stereotype threat has 
shown that awareness of the effect can serve as an inoculation against it. The 
debriefing was intended to provide immediate information about the true nature 
of the study and to address the possibility that stereotypes of aging and driving 
would be more salient to participants previously assigned to the stereotype threat 
condition than the control condition when they returned for their second session. 
Nonetheless, the possibility remained that the stereotype threat manipulation 
may have contaminated implicit and explicit measures of stereotype associations 
as well as the measure of attentional control collected during session 2. To 
address this possibility, independent samples t-tests were conducted on implicit 
and explicit stereotype associations and attentional control measures comparing 
those participants assigned to the threat condition to those assigned to the 
control condition. No differences were observed between threat and control 
participants in attentional control, Likert scale questionnaire responses, feeling 





Study 2 General Discussion 
Consistent with prediction, older adult participants under stereotype threat 
drove slower, produced longer following distances, were involved in more 
collisions, and, to some degree, were less likely to take the prescribed exit than 
control participants. Also consistent with predictions, brake RTs and following 
distances of participants lower in attentional control were most impacted by the 
stereotype threat manipulation. These results clearly demonstrate that, like 
memory performance, older adult driving performance is vulnerable to the 
harmful effects of stereotype threat, but the impact of stereotype threat is related 
to individual differences in attentional control.  
 
Collisions and Stereotype Threat 
Preliminary research (Lambert et al., in preparation) also tested older 
adults driving in a car following paradigm (without stereotype threat). Of the 20 
older adult participants in that study, only 1 collided. Taken together, these 
studies suggest that collisions in car following paradigms are rare, even for older 
adults. Interestingly, four of the six collisions in the present study occurred when 
participants made a relatively difficult lane change to take the exit at the end of 
the scenario. Had the scenario provided more challenging diving situations such 
as this, more collisions may have been observed and possibly an interaction 
between attentional control and stereotype threat like those interactions observed 




attentional control was shown to be related to brake RT and following distance. It 
remains unclear whether the same is true for collisions. While the integrated 
processes model of stereotype threat is a popular one, it is not the only one. 
Many stereotype threat researchers would agree that disrupted attentional 
control is likely one of several mediating processes. If disrupted attentional 
control does not underlie the increased likelihood of collision observed under 
stereotype threat, then this tendency may have been due to some other 
stereotype threat mediator, such as lowered performance expectations (Cadinu, 
Maass, Frigerio, Impagliazzo, & Latinotti, 2003) or reduced effort (Stone, 2002), 
that could have affected anyone, regardless of attentional control.  
 
Elongated Brake RT and Following Distance: Caution Under 
Pressure or Goal Neglect? 
 One might wonder whether the observed increases in brake RT and 
following distance under stereotype threat may be indicative of increased caution 
or vigilance rather than deteriorated driving performance. Arguably, it could be 
the case that the stereotype threat manipulation motivated participants to drive 
more safely. In light of slowed brake RTs, it could be considered prudent and 
strategic to adjust one’s following distance to allow more time for braking 
execution. However, based on earlier research, this is not likely the case.  
The pattern of increases in brake RT and following distance is not new to 
research on cognitive aging and driving.  Strayer and Drews (2004) compared 




and found that older adults displayed slower brake reaction times (RTs) and 
longer following distances than younger adults. While they explained these 
differences in terms of compensation, a similar investigation, preliminary to the 
present research (Lambert et al., in preparation), elucidated the cognitive 
processes underlying these age differences and suggested that they are instead 
due to a combination of age-related changes in information processing speed 
and attentional control. Using a car following paradigm, this preliminary study 
replicated the results of Strayer and Drews (2004) while also measuring 
individual differences in speed of processing and attentional control. Bivariate 
relationships between attentional control and driving performance parameters 
(brake RT and following distance) indicated that participants lower in attentional 
control showed longer brake RTs and following distances than those higher in 
attentional control. Like in the present study, participants in this paradigm were 
given the explicit goal to follow the lead vehicle at a 2-second following distance 
and to brake quickly when the lead vehicle braked. Due to the negative 
relationship between attentional control and the driving performance parameters 
and because age-related declines in attentional control are associated with 
declines in goal maintenance, it was concluded these relationships likely 
reflected goal neglect rather than strategic compensation.  
Interestingly, this pattern also typifies distracted driving where, despite the 
possible compensation interpretation, individuals driving while conversing on a 




2007). In the present study, not only did stereotype threat lead to increases in 
break RT and following distance, it also increased the likelihood of collisions.  
 
Integrated Processes Theory of Stereotype Threat 
 The present results support the Integrated Processes Theory of stereotype 
threat (Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008), particularly in the theory’s assumption 
that cognitive processes reliant on the prefrontal cortex comprise a central role in 
stereotype threat outcomes. The interaction between stereotype threat and 
attentional control suggests that individual differences in frontally mediated 
attentional control determine older adult susceptibility to stereotype threat while 
driving.  
 That said, the approach of the present study differed from that of 
Schmader and Johns (2003) in one important way. Specifically, Schmader and 
Johns treated attentional control as a dependent variable and demonstrated that 
stereotype threat led to reductions in attentional control whereas, in the present 
study, attentional control was treated as an independent variable. Given the 
methodology of the present study, in which attentional control was measured 
after the stereotype threat manipulation, it could be argued that the stereotype 
threat manipulation was modulating attentional control rather than individual 
differences in attentional control modulating stereotype threat susceptibility. 
However, this alternative account is unlikely given that attentional control was not 
measured immediately after the stereotype threat portion of the experiment, but 




control were observed between participants assigned to the stereotype threat 
condition and those assigned to the control condition.  
 While the present results support the Integrated Processes Theory of 
stereotype threat in that they implicate attentional control in stereotype threat 
outcomes, they cannot speak to which of the three interrelated processing 
mechanisms (the physiological stress response, active performance monitoring, 
or suppression effort) or what combination of these mechanisms underlie the 
stereotype threat outcomes observed. Future research could benefit from further 
mechanistic specification, possibly through the use of heart rate and blood 
pressure monitoring (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001; Croizet, 
Després, Gauzins, Huguet, Leyens, & Méot, 2004), self-report measures of 
suppression effort and difficulty (Magee & Teachman, in press), and possibly 
electroencephalography to detect performance monitoring activity of the anterior 
cingulate cortex (Miller, Watson & Strayer, under review). Identification of specific 
mechanisms could provide valuable information to guide intervention 
development. For example, if the effects are, in part, due to the depletion of 
attentional resources in the down-regulation of physiological stress responses, 
psychotropic antianxiety medications or cognitive behavioral therapy may reduce 
older adults’ risk of collision due to stereotype threat.  
 
Unresolved Issues 
 Despite the contributions of this work, important unresolved issues remain. 




participants under stereotype threat, this observation was made in the first 
experimental drive, which was designed to detect changes in brake RT and 
following distance and not specifically collisions. The second experimental drive, 
which was modeled after Yeung and von Hippel (2009) and designed to address 
collisions during an unexpected event, did not show the predicted increase in 
collisions under stereotype threat. Methodological differences between this study 
and that of Yeung and von Hippel may help to explain the inconsistency in 
results. For example, constraints of the driving simulator used in the present 
study made it impossible to replicate Yeung and von Hippel’s simulated driving 
environment. In this study’s simulator, we were unable to animate jay-walking 
pedestrians as Yeung and von Hippel did and instead relied on a swerving 
bicyclist for an unexpected event. Also, through extensive pilot testing that 
manipulated different speeds, corner angles, and timing parameters Yeung and 
von Hippel arrived at an unexpected driving event (jaywalking pedestrians) where 
the collision rate was close to 50%. In the present study, we attempted to 
conduct similar informal pilot testing for the swerving bicyclist event. 
Unfortunately, due to resource constraints, we were unable to conduct this pilot 
testing on the population of interest, older adults, and instead relied on young 
adults. As it turned out, ceiling effects were observed, as most collided with the 
bicyclist regardless of their assigned condition (threat vs. control),  thereby 
suggesting the scenario was too difficult. 
A second unresolved issue pertains to the manipulation check, which did 




interaction between attentional control and stereotype threat. While it is not 
possible to definitively determine why this was the case, it may be that the 
manipulation impacted older adults’ driving performance without their conscious 
awareness of its impact. In other words, participants may have been consciously 
aware of the stereotype threat manipulation but unaware of its impact on their 
affect and performance. In certain situations, particularly those in which the 
performance measure is an automated routine task, increased effort and 
vigilance can lead to stereotype threat effects (Beilock, Jellison, Rydell, 
McConnell, & Carr 2006). It could be argued that some driving situations become 
automated due to a lifetime of practice. In this situation, participants may have 
been aware of their intentional increases in effort and vigilance and thus may 
have mistakenly supposed these increases improved, rather than reduced, their 
driving performance. While this idea is clearly speculative, if correct, it has 
particularly troubling implications because it suggests that older adults who drive 
under stereotype threat may not be aware of their increased risk. Again, the use 
of physiological indices of distress and cognitive load, such as heart rate and 
blood pressure monitoring, in combination with additional self-reported 
instruments of affect such as the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) or the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait scale 
(Speilberger, Gorusch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) could be helpful in 
determining if, in fact, it is the case that the stereotype manipulation is operating 








As a stigmatized group, older adults in the United States face many 
ageism-related challenges. The results of the present study underscore the 
detrimental impact of this unfortunate social phenomenon. This study 
demonstrated that the stereotype of poor older adult driving ability, when made 
explicit through the manipulation of stereotype threat, can have deleterious 
effects on multiple components of older adults’ driving performance. Further, it 
appears that the more vulnerable members (those with reduced attentional 
control) of this already vulnerable group are most at risk. Future research is 
needed to further refine our understanding of the mechanism mediating these 
stereotype threat effects. Successful identification of specific cognitive 





Because driving is commonplace in our culture, and because quality of 
driving performance can potentially affect anyone on the roadway, the findings of 
this dissertation present an urgent public safety concern.  Study 1 clearly 
demonstrated that a negative stereotype of older adult drivers exists within our 
culture. Further, it demonstrated that individual differences in the ability to control 
the stereotype depend on individual differences in attentional control. Study 2 
demonstrated that this stereotype can detrimentally affect older adults’ driving 
performance through the operation of stereotype threat. Thus, it is possible that 
political efforts to limit older adults driving privileges could unintentionally serve 
as stereotype threat manipulations thereby additionally hampering driving quality 
of a group which is already at risk. Further, because stereotype threat 
susceptibility was moderated by attentional control, such that those individuals 
who are lower in attentional control were the ones susceptible to the negative 
consequences of stereotype threat, those individuals who are initially most 
vulnerable could additionally suffer most under stereotype threat conditions. 
The safety of the roads is an important matter of public policy and, while 
federal legislation concerning advanced age and driving eligibility does not 
currently exist, state-based legislative efforts toward this end is ongoing.  For 




the Florida Grand Driver Program® through which concerned family members, 
medical doctors, or law enforcers can report senior drivers whom they believe to 
be safety risks.  The program, then, has the authority to require the driver to take 
a written and/or road driving test with the possibility that the individual may lose 
his or her license to drive (Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor 
Vehicles, 2009). Though safety is the ultimate goal of these legislative efforts, the 
widespread publicity and media coverage that they attract may have 
unintentional consequences that are counterproductive to that ultimate goal. 
Future research is necessary to address this complicated problem. While 
the focus of this dissertation has been on attentional control as a mechanism of 
stereotype threat, multiple stereotype threat mechanisms have been identified. 
For example, negative cognitions (Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, & Kiesner, 
2005), lowered performance expectations (Stangor, Carr, & Kiang, 1998), and 
reduced effort (Stone, 2002) are just a few of the alternate mechanisms through 
which stereotype threat effects may manifest. An improved understanding of the 
specific attentional control mechanisms (physiological stress activation, 
performance monitoring, and/or suppression effort) as well as the possible 
involvement of other social and cognitive mechanisms will be critical in the 
development of threat reduction interventions. 
A variety of techniques have been shown to reduce stereotype threat 
including task reframing (Quinn & Spencer, 2001; Spencer et al., 1999), de-
emphasizing social identities (Stricker & Ward, 2004), encouraging self-




attributions for difficulty (Ben-Zeev, Fein, & Inzlicht 2005; Johns, Schmader, & 
Martens 2005). However, the majority of this work has focused on stereotypes of 
racial/ethnic minorities and women while comparatively little work has focused on 
reducing the impact of stereotype threat in older adults. Of this smaller body of 
literature, research on stereotype threat in older adults has primarily addressed 
changes in cognition, namely memory. De-emphasizing the memory component 
of cognitive tests appears to reduce stereotype threat’s impact on older adult 
memory performance (Chasteen et al., 2005; Hess, Auman, Colcombe, & Rahhal 
2003; Hess, Hinson, & Statham, 2004; Rahha et al., 2001). However, it remains 
unknown as to whether this type of intervention would be successful for driving 
performance. Further, implementation may be more difficult given that it is 
unclear as to how to go about de-emphasizing the driving performance 
component of safe driving.   
Taken together, the present studies implicitly and explicitly document a 
negative stereotype of older drivers and demonstrate that this stereotype has 
serious implications for driving safety in the form of stereotype threat. They 
improve our understanding of the structure of the elderly stereotype and suggest 
promising future directions that may help to attenuate the impact of stereotype 
threat on driving safety. What’s more, they highlight the fact that stereotypes can 
be harmful not only to those who are stereotyped but to the entire social group 
perpetuating the stereotype. This is particularly salient for the stereotype 
explored in the present study. Perpetuation of a negative stereotype of elderly 




share and long-term implications for the safety of younger individuals who may 
one day be the direct victims of a stereotype they perpetuated years ago.  
The present studies suggest that motivation and ability, as they pertain to 
attentional control, may represent important factors for avoiding these outcomes. 
They also underscore the utility of adopting a cognitive neuroscience perspective 
to better understand behavior in social and applied settings. In traditional lab 
settings, individual differences in attentional control have been shown to predict 
performance on a plethora of cognitive outcomes including dichotic listening 
(Colflesh & Conway, 2007), inattention blindness (Seegmiller, Watson, & Strayer, 
2011), and the Stroop color naming task (Kane & Engle, 2002) to name but a 
few. It has also been predictive of performance in more applied contexts, like 
driving (Lambert et al., in preparation). In the present context, where aging 
stereotypes likely created a distraction to be managed, individual differences in 
attentional control again demonstrated predictive utility, suggesting a 







INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with 
each of the statements below by circling the appropriate number using the 
scale below: 
 
1    2    3      4        5 
strongly disagree             strongly agree 
 
 Some people feel I have poor driving ability because of my age. 
 
1     2     3       4         5 
strongly disagree               strongly agree 
 
 Based on my age, people often underestimate my driving ability. 
 
1     2     3       4         5 
strongly disagree               strongly agree 
 
 I often feel I have to prove to others that their perceptions of my driving 
ability are wrong.
 
1     2     3       4         5 
strongly disagree               strongly agree 
 
 The experimenter expected me to do poorly because of my age.  
 
1     2     3       4         5 
strongly disagree               strongly agree 
 
 In driving situations people my age often face biased evaluations. 
 
1     2     3       4         5 








Vignette 1: On July 16, 2003, 86-year-old George Weller crashed into a packed 
farmer’s market in Santa Monica, California, at highway speed, killing 10 people 
and injuring dozens more. Found guilty of vehicular manslaughter with gross 
negligence, Weller was nearly assured of prison time. But on November 21, 
2006, a California judge decided that Weller, now 89 and in very poor health, was 
too old and sick to go to prison and would receive fines and probation instead.  
 
Vignette 2: An elderly driver crashed his car right through the front of a Barnes & 
Noble bookstore Saturday. Police say the man was driving through the parking 
lot when his foot slipped off the brake and hit the gas. He tried to swerve the car 
to avoid impact but ended up inside the store. Police say no one was hurt. They 
also say they are not planning to cite the driver because the accident happened 








Figure 7. Sample stereotype threat induction instrument 2 depicting fatal 
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